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Freedom of Expression and the Chilling Effect 
 
Judith Townend,1  
 
1. Introduction to the chilling effect 
The notion of speech, or expression, being ‘chilled’ is a pervasive and popular 
one. It metaphorically suggests a negative deterrence of communication: that a 
person or organisation is made physically colder by inhibiting the exercise of 
their right to free expression.  
 
The chilling effect is not an esoteric legal metaphor:  journalists and campaign 
groups cite it frequently. It can, but does not have to mean, an outright 
obstruction of human rights relating to speech. ‘Chilling’ does not necessarily 
mean to make ice cold; the metaphorical suggestion of temperature suggests a 
scale of deterrence from cool to freezing.  The chilling effect is used to describe 
overt censorship such as a government banning publication of a book, as well as 
more subtle controls such as ambiguous legislation and high legal costs that 
provoke uncertainty and fear among writers and journalists.  
 
The judiciary has played an important role in the popularisation of this highly 
flexible metaphor. Since the mid-1950s judges – first in the United States but 
now all over the world - have used it to explain decisions relating to individuals’ 
and organisations’ right to freedom of expression. Despite its global prevalence, 
there has been very little interrogation of what it actually means and the rare 
attempts to systematically document the chilling effect of statutes and judicial 
decisions on freedom of expression are stymied by a lack of reliable and 
available data.  
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With a focus on the chilling effect’s origins in the US and the jurisdiction of 
England and Wales, this chapter first traces the historical roots of the ‘chilling 
effect’ concept in relation to human rights, and in particular, laws of defamation 
and privacy, and the areas of freedom of information and state surveillance. It 
then considers the difference between its judicial and social use within and 
between these distinct areas of law. Second, it turns to the question of 
measurement, examining attempts to systematically document the chill. Third, it 
considers the impact of the chilling effect metaphor on communication law and 
policymaking and argues that in order to better protect fundamental human 
rights, there is a need for clearer articulation by lawmakers of desired 
boundaries for legitimate speech.   
2. Historical development of the chilling effect  
2.1. First Amendment origins 
The first documented appearance2 of the ‘chill’ metaphor to describe the future 
deterrence of free activity and speech is in a First Amendment case which 
recognised that demanding a loyalty oath from state employees in Oklahoma had 
‘an unmistakable tendency to chill … free play of the spirit’ and made ‘for caution 
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers’ (U.S. 1952: p. 195). Ten 
years later, the ‘chilling effect’ concept made its debut; the court identified a 
‘deterrent and “chilling” effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined 
rights of free speech’ when NAACP membership records for alleged 
‘Communists’ were demanded by a legislative investigating committee in Florida 
(U.S. 1963: p. 557).  
 
The chilling effect may have originated in an even earlier undocumented 
example, but its precise origin is perhaps less relevant than the growing 
prevalence and import of the metaphor in the 20th and 21st centuries. Writing 15 
years after the first judicial utterance of the chilling effect, Schauer found that the 
concept of the chilling effect had ‘grown from an emotive argument into a major 
substantive component of first amendment adjudication’ and that its use 
‘accounts for some very significant advances in free speech theory, and, in fact, 
the chilling effect doctrine underlies the resolution of many cases in which it is 
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neither expressed nor clearly implied’ (1978: p. 685). The metaphor regularly 
appears in a variety of legal contexts, connected by the theme of freedom of 
expression, but quite different in nature from those early cases concerning 
freedom of political expression and association.  
2.2. Defamation 
The ‘chilling effect’ concept is perhaps best known in the context of defamation 
law and in particular, in the permanent form of defamation known as libel. This 
is partly because the chilling effect has been taken on as the war cry of 
individuals and organisations calling for the relaxation of onerous libel laws and 
reform of high libel costs, and was a motif of the high profile libel reform 
campaign of 2009-133 that led to the introduction of the Defamation Act 2013 in 
England and Wales.4  The metaphor was also appropriated by the British 
government when it asserted that the new Act would ‘reverse’ the chill on 
freedom of expression (Ministry of Justice 2013); a claim which is difficult to 
assess, as will be further discussed below (see: ‘Measurement’).   
 
For many media lawyers, it is New York Times v Sullivan (U.S. 1964) that most 
closely resonates with the chilling effect, which held that a state cannot award a 
public official damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he or she proves ‘actual malice’, that is, that the defendant made a 
statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not. This landmark ruling has been widely perceived to reduce the 
chilling effect of defamation actions against US media organisations, but this 
came ‘at a price’, in Schauer’s view (1978: p. 708). It was, he argues, an imperfect 
solution; it requires that ‘we must prohibit the imposition of sanctions in 
instances where ideally they would be permitted’ (1978: p. 685).  Some 
commentators refer to this as another kind of chilling effect, where potential 
claimants may be deterred from pursuing a claim in defamation owing to legal 
uncertainty or relaxed provisions (see, for example, Kenyon, 2013: p.228; Page, 
2015: p. 1).  
 
Accepted version. To appear in the Routledge Companion to Media and Human 
Rights.  
 
It was several decades after the ruling in New York Times v Sullivan that the 
chilling effect concept really took hold in the English courts, although related 
issues had been considered. In Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers 
(UKHL 1992), which considered whether a local authority could maintain a claim 
for defamation damages, the House of Lords drew on New York Times v Sullivan 
to explain that while the decision was related to the US constitutional right to 
freedom of speech, ‘the public interest considerations which underlaid them are 
no less valid in this country’. What has been described as “the chilling effect” 
induced by the threat of civil actions for libel is very important’, observed Lord 
Keith (UKHL 1993: p. 8).  
 
The ‘chilling effect’ was again directly discussed in Reynolds v Times Newspapers 
Ltd (UKHL 1999) although, as Cheer has pointed out (2008, p.66), the dicta 
‘reveal a House of Lords which is wary of the press and somewhat sceptical of a 
chilling effect’. Lord Nicholls acknowledged that unpredictability and 
uncertainty, coupled with the high costs of defending an action, affects a 
journalist’s decision and may ‘“chill” the publication of true statements of fact as 
well as those which are untrue’. The chill should not, however, be exaggerated 
and could vary between different types of publications. ‘[W]ith the enunciation 
of some guidelines by the court, any practical problems should be manageable’ 
(UKHL 1999).   
 
Ambiguity remained central to the chilling effect concept in Eady J’s ruling in 
Jameel v The Wall Street Journal Europe (EWHC 2004), which found ‘there is no 
more ‘chilling effect’ upon freedom of communication … than uncertainty as to 
the lawfulness of one’s actions’ (para. 17). His point was underlined, perhaps, by 
the House of Lords’ decision in the Wall Street Journal’s favour, overturning the 
Court of Appeal’s and Eady J’s earlier decision that the publication did not have 
recourse to the qualified privilege defence established in Reynolds as the 
requirements of responsible journalism had not been satisfied; the Lords held 
that they had been (UKHL 2006); indeed, the lawfulness of one’s actions is not 
easily predictable! 
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The subjectivities of the chilling effect were clearly demonstrated in the House of 
Lords ruling: Lord Bingham found ‘the weight placed by the newspaper on the 
chilling effect’ of the existing rule was in his opinion ‘exaggerated’ (UKHL 2006: 
para. 21). Baroness Hale, on the other hand, was more sympathetic to 
newspapers’ position, describing a ‘disproportionately chilling effect upon 
freedom of speech’ (para. 154). 
 
Though receiving mixed reception, the chilling effect is an increasingly common 
consideration in English defamation cases, since its first appearance in the late 
20th century. While the doctrine may hold more sway in cases based in the US 
than in England and Wales, it has arguably affected influential judicial decisions 
in defamation cases, as well as broader policy; namely, the introduction of the 
Defamation Act 2013. It has also been a central consideration in a number of 
privacy cases.  
 
2.2. Privacy  
The courts’ extension of the chilling effect concept to privacy law has been fairly 
seamless and widely adopted by the courts and the media. In Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd (EWHC 2008), in which the claimant Max Mosley 
successfully sued the News of the World newspaper for breach of privacy, 
exemplary damages were refused; in Eady J’s view, such damages would have 
provided a form of relief in a new area of law that was unnecessary, nor legally 
prescribed. For that reason, ‘the “chilling effect” would be obvious”’ (para. 173).   
 
Chilling effect claims have tended to focus on costs even when making a broader 
point about threats to freedom of expression. For example, when various 
freedom speech groups intervening in Mosley v United Kingdom (ECtHR 2011: 
para. 103) were concerned that any requirement to notify the subject of a story 
ahead of publication would give rise to a chilling effect, the focus was on the high 
cost of (even successfully) defending injunction proceedings arising from 
compulsory notification.  
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This case also highlighted several other facets of the ‘chilling effect’ principle. 
Beyond costs, the court considered the effectiveness of a pre-notification 
obligation and a possible exception for newspapers if they could show that the 
public interest was at stake. In this context, a narrowly defined understanding of 
public interest is identified as a potential chilling effect (para. 126). Additionally, 
the judgment reinforces another element of the chilling effect doctrine: that it 
anticipates the implications of future behaviour outside the case under 
consideration. Mosley’s bid for a legally binding pre-notification requirement is 
examined beyond the facts of his case, considering the ‘chilling effect to which a 
pre-notification requirement risks giving rise’ (para. 132).  
 
Whereas discussion of chilling effects in defamation have tended to concentrate 
on the damage to journalists’ ability to hold political and financial power to 
account, it is not generally so in privacy, where many claims against the media 
have concerned the private lives of celebrities and sportspeople. In a speech in 
2009, Sir David Eady observed that few privacy cases are contested with a public 
interest defence.  
2.3. Freedom of Information  
In the past few years, a chilling effect has been described in a very different 
context relating to communication: in relation to freedom of information (FOI) 
laws that enable public access to information.  In this context, it would be a 
stretch to describe the chilling effect as a developed doctrine as such, but the 
concept has played an influential role in shaping discussions on the development 
of FOI. 
 
It is not the public or press which has been described as chilled in this context 
but ministers and civil servants. It has been claimed that freedom of information 
laws can cause public servants to avoid frank and candid discussion during 
policy deliberations and to keep inadequate records (see Bannister 2015: p. 
342). It remains a contentious claim that has been treated somewhat sceptically, 
however. Lord McNally told the UK’s Independent Freedom of Information 
Commission that he had not witnessed ministers choosing to exchange views 
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privately rather than commit them to writing although he had heard ‘mandarins’ 
speak of this phenomenon (Gov.uk 2016: p. 36).   
 
In the FOI context, the chilling effect argument has received markedly different 
treatment between tribunals and other bodies considering disclosure of the 
same information. A First-Tier Tribunal which considered a likely 
‘discouragement of candour, imagination and innovation’ (FTT 2014: para. 60) 
resulting from disclosure of information on the implementation of universal 
work credit, found there was ‘no evidence to support the claim’ (2014: para. 62). 
In contrast, the Upper Tribunal subsequently found that expecting such evidence 
was an ‘unrealistic and unattainable standard for the Department [of Work and 
Pensions] to meet’ and that such effects might be ‘subtle’ and without paper trail. 
(UT 2015: para. 18).5  
 
More generally, a parliamentary committee examining the issue was ‘not able to 
conclude, with any certainty, that a chilling effect has resulted from the FOI Act’ 
(House of Commons 2012: p. 75). The outgoing Information Commissioner 
Christopher Graham has suggested that ‘if mandarins keep talking about a 
chilling effect, theirs is a self-fulfilling prophecy’ (ICO 2015).  
2.4. Surveillance  
How does knowledge that you are being watched affect your behaviour?  This is 
the question at the heart of the discussion on the chilling effect of surveillance 
powers – whether used by the state or a private entity such as Google or 
Facebook, for example.  Survey research indicates that knowledge of monitoring 
programmes causes writers and journalists to self-censor what they search for 
(PEN American Center 2013), although the relationship between surveillance 
and individuals’ behaviour may be more nuanced than a ‘blanket silencing’ (see 
Stoycheff 2016). 
 
The chilling effect is alluded to in surveillance-related case law, but not 
extensively or explicitly. In the Digital Rights Ireland case, Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón’s non-binding opinion identified a ‘vague feeling of surveillance’ which 
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may affect rights to freedom of expression. But, he noted, the court did not have 
‘sufficient material’ to give a ruling in that regard, and that the ‘[chilling] effect 
would be merely a collateral consequence of interference with the right to 
privacy (…)’ (CJEU 2013: para. 52). 
 
In this context, the claimed effect is perhaps even more pernicious than the 
defamation or privacy chills described above, as it affects not only what an 
individual might write but also what they might read.   
2.5 Distinctions in use  
Observed chilling effects are not limited to the communication areas described 
above; they have also been claimed in other areas of media law: as a result of the 
use of copyright, data protection, contempt of court and various criminal 
sanctions for speech.6 Within these various communication contexts the chilling 
effect takes different forms. To date, scholars have tended to define these in 
binary terms.    
Benign and invidious chills 
Schauer defines the ‘benign’ deterrence as ‘an effect caused by the intentional 
regulation of speech or other activity properly subject to governmental control’ 
(1978: p. 690).  This is comparable to what a previous UK Information 
Commissioner saw as the ‘beneficially chilling effect’ of penalties to deter illegal 
data protection breaches (Graham, cited in Leveson 2012: para. 2.8, p. 1089).  
Cheer’s study of defamation in New Zealand also emphasises the distinction that 
some chilling effects are permissible and desirable (2008: p. 62), suggesting that 
‘in order to protect reputation, defamation must chill some speech’ (p. 63). These 
interpretations suggest that a chilling effect can be understood as benign and 
desirable, where a restriction is usefully and appropriately applied.  
 
In contrast, Schauer describes what he sees as an undesirable chill: an ‘invidious’ 
deterrence: ‘this can occur not only when activity shielded by the first 
amendment is implicated, but also when any behaviour safeguarded by the [US] 
Constitution is unduly discouraged’ (1978: p. 690).  The danger of ‘invidious’ 
deterrence, argues Schauer, lies in the fact ‘deterred by the fear of punishment, 
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some individuals refrain from saying or publishing something that which they 
lawfully could, and indeed, should’. As well as the harm that arises from the non-
exercise of a constitutional right, this could cause ‘general societal loss’ (p. 693). 
Direct and indirect chills  
Barendt et al. provide a two-part classification, which allows for both ‘direct’ and 
‘structural’ illegitimate deterrence, or ‘chilling effects’. The direct chill takes 
place when material is specifically changed as a result of legal considerations, of 
which the ‘if in doubt, take it out’ philosophy ‘exemplified by most magazine 
editors and publishers’ is part and described as ‘conscious inhibition’ or ‘self-
censorship’ (Barendt et al. 1997: p. 191). Significantly, they identify that this is 
not necessarily ‘uniform’: ‘different media experience [it] with notably different 
force’.   
 
The second category, the ‘structural’ and indirect chilling effect refers to a 
‘deeper, subtler way in which libel inhibits media publication’. This prevents the 
very creation of media content, with avoidance of ‘taboo’ organizations and 
individuals: ‘certain subjects are treated as off-limits, minefields into which it is 
too difficult to stray. Nothing is edited to lessen libel risk because nothing is 
written in the first place’ (p. 192). 
 
Additionally, there is a secondary form within this ‘structural’ deterrence, a 
tendency towards a more polemical and opaque style, favouring comment over 
‘clear’ and ‘hard-edged’ investigative journalism, which the authors suggest 
could be a result of the journalists’ interpretation of the fair comment defence, 
perceived as more lenient than the defence of justification in defamation cases7 
(p. 193). They emphasise, however, that the idea that style has been moulded by 
the law of defamation is ‘untestable’, a commonly identified problem for 
researchers in this area.   
 
The two sets of characteristics described by Schauer and Barendt et al. can 
manifest themselves as shown in the table below: 
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<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
At worst (for their freedom of speech), a publisher might encounter an invidious 
and direct chill; at best (for their freedom of speech), a benign and indirect chill.  
This scale is depicted below: 
 
 <INSERT FIGURE 1>  
 
Chills arising from speech protection 
Finally, there is evidence of alternative chills, which can be understood as side 
effects of attempts to reduce the chill on speech. In the context of defamation and 
privacy, some commentators have worried about the potential chilling effect on 
claimants and the inclination of individuals to enter public life. It has even been 
suggested that law enforcing authorities are themselves chilled. Leveson LJ, for 
example, suggested that a ‘special enforcement regime’ in the Data Protection 
Act 1998, giving the press special exemptions from legislative provisions, had a 
‘chilling effect on reasonable law enforcement and, equally, had a high risk of 
impacting unfairly on individuals’ (Leveson 2012: para. 2.55, p. 1081). 
3. Measurement   
Though chilling effects are widely cited and claimed systematic and reliable 
evidence is difficult to locate within and outside case law. The overall 
methodological challenge is that one is seeking to prove a negative – or a 
counterfactual - and looking for evidence that could be seen to reflect badly on 
those ‘chilled’ or ‘chilling’ (see Knight 2015). In the context of FOI, it would 
require asking civil servants to admit they had been deliberately obfuscating 
information which could be seen as unprofessional conduct (Worthy, 
forthcoming). My own empirical research on the relationship between 
defamation and privacy law and journalism, suggests that while journalists and 
lawyers were often willing to discuss the chilling effect in general, they can be 
reluctant – or are unable - to give specific examples from their own experience 
(Townend 2015).  
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Kendrick suggests that problem with the application of the chilling effect concept 
is that ‘both the detection of a problem and the imposition of a remedy involve 
intractable empirical difficulties’ and unambiguously suggests that the US 
Supreme Court ‘has founded the chilling effect on nothing more than 
unpersuasive empirical guesswork’ (2013: p. 1633). Worthy points out two 
obstacles to documenting the chill in the FOI context: first, locating hard 
evidence rather than anecdote; and second, isolating FOI as the causal factor 
rather than departmental or ministerial leaks, or a tendency for informal 
meetings enabled by new technology. In his view, it is impossible to say if there 
is or is not an effect (Worthy, forthcoming).  
 
Nonetheless, efforts have been made, particularly in the context of defamation 
and copyright. In the US, a Harvard-born project called the Chilling Effects 
Clearinghouse, now known as Lumen, has documented defamation and copyright 
threats in the form of cease-and-desist letters. One reason for changing its name 
in 2016 was that it could lead people to think that it only included ‘notices that 
have in fact had a “chilling effect” on conduct or speech’, which was too ‘limiting’ 
for its role as a ‘neutral third party’ collecting and monitoring notices (Lumen 
2016). This points to a critical issue for any researcher documenting chills: to 
determine whether a threat could be described as a chill, one has to consider 
first whether a threat has deterred, or is likely to deter, speech; and second, 
whether such deterrence is necessarily undesirable.  Given the variety of judicial 
interpretation on the desirability of speech, let alone everyday interpretation, 
this is not easy.  
 
Kenyon argues that there are better ways than theoretical conjecture to assess 
the potential for defamation reform (2001: p. 546) and there have been a 
number of attempts to go beyond the case law and document the chill of 
defamation law in comparative studies using content analysis (Dent and Kenyon 
2004) interviews and surveys (Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2008; Weaver et al. 
2004; Cheer 2008; Townend 2014, 2015) but all indicate some of the 
methodological difficulties.  
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Kenyon’s observation that the area deserves greater attention from researchers 
and their funders still stands over a decade later, certainly in the UK context. 
Researchers need not confine themselves to self-reporting surveys and 
interviews to gather data: observational techniques that record users’ actual 
online behaviour could prove a fruitful if challenging methodology for 
monitoring deterring effects.  Additionally, we might learn from the judicial 
consideration of the chilling effect in different communication and information 
law settings.  
4.  Seeking clarity   
One of the few scholars to dig beneath the metaphor, Haig Bosmajian, warns that 
while tropes such as the chilling effect  ‘can help us comprehend what may have 
been incomprehensible’, there is a danger that they can lead us to ‘mislead, 
conceal, create misunderstandings, and come to rely on clichéd thinking’ (1992: 
p. 205). Though the chilling effect and other communication metaphors have 
been used to develop doctrines and principles in law there is insufficient 
examination of their function and implication on judicial decisions (Bosmajian 
1992: p. 7).  
 
Academic empirical studies, public statements in speeches and the media and 
case law all indicate that chilling effect definitions in different communication 
contexts are indeed as ‘slippery’ and ‘amorphous’ as US Justice Harlan warned in 
the metaphor’s younger days (U.S. 1967).  This does not, however, mean that the 
phenomena described by the chilling effect metaphor are necessarily imagined 
or non-existent. Even those scholars engaged in critical analysis of the concept, 
are reluctant to suggest the chilling effect is not ‘real’ or should play no role in 
the development of law relating to freedom of expression.  
 
The concept should not, however, be used without interrogation, especially 
when it is deployed as legal doctrine. This requires relevant parties, lawyers and 
judges to be specific about what they are describing. Are they talking about 
benign or invidious effects, i.e. where speech is deterred legitimately or 
illegitimately under current law? Are they referring to direct or indirect effects, 
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i.e. where speech is directly deterred as the result of a specific threat, or 
indirectly because there is a more general concern? Does speech risk being 
deterred because of a clear legal provision, or because of uncertainty in the law 
and the legal process? Is the issue the substantive law, or procedural factors such 
as cost? On what evidence have they drawn their conclusion, and why? This is 
especially important if the determination of a chilling effect forms part of the 
central reasoning in a case, or if a specific legal reform is being sought.  
 
A clearer understanding of chilling effect claims would lead to a more 
appropriate application. Certainly, this would be helpful as a point of reference in 
lawmaking: for judges, parliamentarians and policymakers. But it would not 
reflect the way the metaphor is used in society and understood by individuals 
interacting with communication law, that is journalists, charity and NGO 
professionals and ordinary members of the public wishing to express themselves 
online and access information. A further problem is that boundaries between 
legitimate/desirable and illegitimate/undesirable speech are keenly contested, 
both within and outside courts. Even if one formed a definition based on, let’s 
say, the public interest, it is clear that interpretations of the public interest can 
vary dramatically (see, for example, Morrison and Svennevig, 2002).  
 
However the chilling effect is defined in relation to the exercise of human rights, 
some deterrence of expression is inevitable owing to the uncertainty of law and 
the fact that individuals are risk averse (see Schauer: p. 731), although 
lawmakers should seek to minimise this uncertainty in the clear design of 
foreseeable and accessible legislation and through comprehensible case law. 
Given that some sort of deterrence will always exist, the chilling effect doctrine 
applied by the courts allows judges to favour the protection of speech rights even 
in the absence of specific evidence predicting the future behaviour of individuals 
(see Schauer: p. 731-2).  
5. Conclusion 
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In lieu of positing a firm definition for the social concept or legal doctrine, I 
propose that greater clarity in research, law and policymaking might be achieved 
through specificity about what is claimed when a chilling effect is asserted, and 
ideally, evidence of its existence (or its non-existence, if the opposite is claimed). 
This will help the formulation of better laws and legal processes relating to 
human rights and communication: reforming law where it is seen to have an 
overly and detrimentally restrictive effect on freedom of speech and simplifying 
court processes to reduce its burdens of mental stress, money and time.    
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TABLE 1  
 
 
Type of chill Direct  Indirect  
Benign  Where a specific threat of 
legal action deters 
illegitimate speech  
Where a broad concern about 
legal action deters illegitimate 
speech  
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Invidious  Where a specific threat of 
legal action deters 
legitimate speech 
Where a broad concern about 
legal action deters legitimate 
speech  













1 With thanks to Judith Bannister, Eric Barendt, Natali Helberger, Nora Ni 
Loideain, Lorna Woods, and Ben Worthy ,  for their suggestions and feedback, 
which will also inform my future work. All errors and omissions remain my own. 
2 This is the first instance of its use reported by Schauer (1978) and Bosmajian 
(1992). There may be earlier undiscovered judicial uses.  
3 The campaign has not formally ended: although it considers the passage of the 
2013 Act a marker of success in England and Wales and it is less active since that 
time, it continues to publicise the situation in Northern Ireland, where the Act 
has not been extended, and in Scotland, where it only partially applies.  
4 See, for example, Glanville 2009; Glanville and Heawood 2009. 
5 When the case was later re-heard in the First Tier Tribunal, the court was not 
convinced that risk of disclosure would create pressure to cause a change in civil 
servants’ behaviour (FTT 2016: para. 63).  
6 In England and Wales this would include, for example, offences under 
Communications Act 2003 section 127 or the Malicious Communications Act 
1988 section 1. There are also criminal offences associated with data protection, 
contempt of court and copyright. In other countries, defamation and breach of 
privacy may be treated as criminal offences.  
7 The authors emphasise that it would be inaccurate for a journalist to act on the 
belief that presenting allegations of fact as statements of opinion will provide an 
automatic protection from libel action (Barendt et al. 1997: p. 193). These 
defences are now known as truth and honest opinion.   
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